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Abstract 
 
Choice of a share vs. fixed rent land rental contract has figured prominently in the theory 
of industrial organization. This theory tells us that, while a share contract is inefficient in a 
first-best world, it may be the preferred option under second-best conditions. It has thus 
predicted the existence of sharecropping as the potentially preferred contract under 
conditions of liquidity constraint. Rigorous empirical evidence is however still lacking on 
this basic contribution of theory. We use a randomized experiment in a credit program for 
landless workers and marginal farmers organized by BRAC in Bangladesh to show that 
increased access to credit has a large positive effect on the choice of fixed rent over share 
rent contracts, both in terms of number of contracts and area contracted. As predicted by 
theory, the magnitude of this shift away from sharecropping is enhanced when the tenant is 
less exposed to risk. Development programs that facilitate access to credit to potential 
tenants can thus help them take more efficient land rental contracts. 
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1. Introduction 
Share tenancy as a form of land contracting where rent is set as a share of output is 
widespread across the world. In the 1970s, about 36.2% of the world’s total farmlands 
were under pure or owner-cum tenancy, 61.1% under owner cultivation, and the remaining 
under other forms of tenure (Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami 1992). Of tenanted lands, 36.1% 
were under share tenancy. For Asia, the corresponding proportions were 16% of cultivated 
land in tenancy and 84.5% of tenanted land under share tenancy. Recent data show that in 
Bangladesh, the context of this study, 24% of the cultivated land was rented, and 43% of 
tenanted land was under share contract in 2008 (BBS 2011). A share contract is, however, 
inferior to a fixed rent contract in eliciting effort under first-best market conditions, a 
phenomenon famously known as the “Marshallian inefficiency of sharecropping”.1 
A voluminous literature provides theoretical explanations on the resulting puzzle of the 
widespread existence of sharecropping, examining the potential role of various deviations 
from the first best (Quibria and Rashid 1984; Hayami and Otsuka 1993). One such 
deviation is existence of a liquidity constraint. Laffont and Matoussi (1995) show that a 
liquidity constraint on tenants increases the prevalence of share contracting relative to 
fixed rent. Shetty (1988) develops a theoretical model where choice of sharecropping is 
explained by the risk of ex-post liquidity constraints, as a fixed rent could not be fully paid 
in bad states of nature. Braverman and Stiglitz (1989) show that, in a general equilibrium 
model of land allocation, when credit is rationed a capital intensive technological change 
can induce a long-term increase in concentration of land ownership and in sharecropping 
arrangements as tenants are capital constrained, lowering productivity. Relaxation of a 
credit constraint can thus be an effective way of reducing the incidence of second-best 
efficient share contracts. The theoretical literature on sharecropping also emphasizes the 
role of risk in explaining the prevalence of share contracts when insurance markets are 
failing and when the tenant is not able or willing to absorb all the production risk. Stiglitz 
(1974) shows that sharecropping allows risk sharing between landlord and tenant as the 
rent paid varies with the stochastic level of output achieved. This creates a trade-off 
between increasing tenant effort by reducing his exposure to risk through a lower output 
share, and decreasing effort by use of the same instrument. Relaxation of the credit 
constraint in inducing the choice of a fixed rent over a share rent contract should thus be 
more intense when risk is less constraining on the tenant.2  
                                               
1 The essence of the Marshallian inefficiency is that, under a share contract, the tenant only receives a share 
of output while assuming the full cost of some of the inputs, labor in particular, which leads to suboptimal 
provision of the inputs not shared in equal proportion to output.  There is substantial empirical evidence on 
the Marshallian inefficiency of sharecropping (Shaban 1987; Bell 1977; Sadoulet et al. 1997; Arcand et al. 
2007). There is also evidence that moral hazard alone cannot explain the observed inefficiency. Jacoby and 
Mansuri (2008) suggest that imperfect commitment can also drive inefficiency. 
2 Another argument for sharecropping is missing markets for inputs such as farm management and labor 
supervision capacity when they are non-contractible and one is more efficiently performed by the landlord 
and the other by the tenant (Eswaran and Kotwal 1985).  We do not explore this mechanism in this paper. 
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While the theory of sharecropping as a potentially second-best efficient contract when the 
tenant is liquidity constrained is well established, rigorous empirical evidence on the effect 
of a liquidity constraint on the choice of land contract is limited. Laffont and Matoussi 
(1995) investigate this empirically using data collected on 100 households from rural 
Tunisia in 1986.3 The analysis was carried out at the plot level, with liquidity measured as 
the amount of working capital (defined as available monetary liquidity and rental value of 
equipment owned) available to the farmer. They found that tenants with higher level of 
working capital are more likely to have fixed rent contracts. Using plot-level data from 
three Indian villages, Chaudhuri and Maitra (1997) also show that an increase in the 
tenant’s capacity to borrow (measured by his outstanding debt) increases the probability of 
a fixed rental contract relative to a sharecropping contract. Difficulty with both analyses is 
the presumed exogeneity of the tenant’s working capital or borrowing capacity.   
In this paper, we develop a simple model on how liquidity constraint can affect the choice 
of land rental contract. Guided by the model’s theoretical predictions, we estimate the 
effect of access to credit on the choice of contract. We use for this a randomized 
experiment built in a program organized by BRAC in Bangladesh that offers credit to 
landless workers and smallholder farmers. Further, guided by the theoretical prediction that 
the choice of a sharecropping over a fixed rent contract can also be explained by the 
tenant’s exposure to uninsured risk, we investigate whether the effect of credit on the 
choice of land contract is heterogeneous with respect to exposure to risk.  
We find that the effect of access to credit on taking fixed rent contracts is positive and 
large in magnitude for both the number of contracts and the area contracted while the 
effect on taking share contracts is small and statistically insignificant for both outcomes. 
We also find that the effect of credit on choice of fixed rent contract is heterogeneous, with 
larger responses for tenants that are in contexts with less risky weather conditions. 
This paper contributes to the literature on credit markets and sharecropping following the 
seminal paper of Laffont and Matoussi (1995). We deviate from this and other studies by 
using data from a randomized controlled experiment of a unique credit program for 
landless workers and smallholder farmers. As such, we provide the first rigorous empirical 
evidence on the role of a financial constraint on contract choice, as well as on the 
mitigating role of risk in responding to a relaxation of the liquidity constraint. In addition 
to providing rigorous identification of causality, our study is based on solid empirical 
evidence based on a large sample compared to previous studies. The study of Laffont and 
Matoussi (1995) was based on a small sample of 170 plots from Tunisia while that of 
Chaudhuri and Maitra (1997) was based on data for 266 plots in only three Indian villages. 
By contrast, our study covers 22 districts (out of 64) in Bangladesh, and more than 4,000 
potential tenants. The program we study has been the object of an impact analysis by 
                                               
3 They used another similar data set collected in 1988 to test the robustness of their results.  
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Hossain et al. (2018), but with a different focus. They found that the program induced an 
increase in farm activities and in crop income among the targeted farmers, although they 
observe that this may not be sufficient to make a significant difference in overall income. 
They also briefly look at the impact on land rental, although without distinguishing as we 
do by contract type and by season, and find like us no aggregate impact on land rental. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we develop a simple model 
on how a liquidity constraint affects the choice of land rental contract. In section 3, we give 
information on farming and land rental contracts in Bangladesh. Section 4 presents the 
BRAC credit program and the evaluation design. Section 5 explains the data used in this 
study, the program take-up, and gives descriptive statistics on households and contracts. 
Section 6 presents the results on the impact of access to credit on contract choice. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. A model of contract choice  
The theory of how a liquidity constraint affects the choice of land rental contract was first 
developed by Laffont and Matoussi (1995) in a principal-agent model, where the tenant has 
limited availability of working capital and his effective labor is unobservable to the 
landlord. The landlord chooses the terms of the contract (a general non-linear contract with 
a share of the product kept by the tenant, a share of the inputs paid by the tenant, and a 
fixed cash payment made by the tenant to the landlord) under the tenant’s incentive and 
participation constraints. The main prediction of the model is that conditionally on the 
level of other inputs, the tenant’s output share in the contract is increasing in the tenant’s 
working capital. This model could not be fully solved analytically, and does not 
accommodate risk. We consequently present a simpler framework that only considers two 
pre-specified contracts rather than a continuum and a simpler production function, but that 
can be solved analytically and accommodates risk to illustrate how a liquidity constraint 
can affect the choice of contract for a particular plot. We use a Cobb-Douglas 
specification, where output is function of land and labor (labor stands for all variable costs, 
including seeds, irrigation, and chemicals).  Plots of given size A are available for rent 
under two types of contracts: a sharecropping contract where payment to the landlord is in 
the form of a share " of output or a fixed rent contract where land is rented at a fixed rental 
rate r.  The tenant faces a financial constraint in covering pre-harvest costs, i.e., labor and 
if under a fixed rent contract land rental.  
A generic expression for the tenant’s profit under both contracts is: # = "%&'(	)* − ,' − -)	 
where L is labor, p the expected output price, w the price or opportunity cost of labor, and & a stochastic term of mean 1 and variance ./. The sharecropping contract is obtained for - = 0 and 0 < " < 1, and the fixed rent contract for - > 0 and " = 1. 
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Consider first risk neutral tenants.  The tenant’s optimization problem is to choose labor to 
maximize expected profits under the liquidity constraint: max7 8# = "% '(	)* − ,' − -)	 s.t.		,' + -) ≤ >			 
 
where K is total liquidity available to the tenant.4  
The solution is: 
 ' = minABCDEF , HIJ	(EKF L MMNO	P 
where the first term corresponds to the cases where the liquidity constraint binds.  
Correspondingly, expected profit is: 
  8# = min A"% HBCDEF L( )* − >,, HIJ	(EKF L MMNO HQC(( L − -)	P.   (1) 
Under both types of contracts, the tenant operates under liquidity constraint and expected 
profits are monotonically increasing in K for: 
 > < >R(", -) = , HIJ	(EKF L MMNO + -). (2) 
This expression shows that the liquidity necessary to operate optimally under 
sharecropping is less than what is necessary under a fixed rent contract for two reasons: 
under sharecropping, due to the Marshallian disincentive, a lower level of labor is applied 
to production, implying a lower wage bill, and there is no land rent to be paid before 
harvest.   
Profit as a function of available liquidity K is represented in Figure 1. The S curve shows 
profit under sharecropping, which increases steadily with K under liquidity constraint until > = >R(", 0), defined in equation (2), where it reaches its unconstrained maximum. Curves 
F1 and F2 represent profit under fixed rent, for a low and a high value of the fixed rental 
rate r, respectively, assuming fixed rent tenants to be always liquidity constrained. 
Comparing expected profits (equation (1)) under the two contracts shows that, for low 
values of > < DEQCIM/O	 (represented on the figure by K1 and K2, for low and high rental rate 
r respectively) expected profits are higher with sharecropping than with a fixed rent 
contract, while for higher values of K, expected profits are higher with a fixed rent 
contract.  The two profit curves thus exhibit a single crossing.  The intuition is that under 
sharecropping, payment to the landlord increases with production and hence with liquidity, 
while it remains constant under a fixed-rent contract. 
                                               
4 To keep the model simple, we do not specify separately the amount of liquidity that comes from the tenant’s 
own resources and that which is borrowed, and assume a zero interest rate on all liquidity K used for inputs.  
We also do not consider that in sharecropping contracts, landlords often contribute some of the non-labor 
costs.  This would add to the differential need for liquidity between the sharecropping and the fixed-rent 
contracts.  
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Consider now the case of a risk-averse tenant who maximizes: max7 V = 8# − WVar(#) = "% '(	)* − ,' − -) − W./Z"%'(	)*[/ s.t.		,' + -) ≤ >			 
where R is the coefficient of risk aversion. 
How does risk aversion affect the relative benefits of sharecropping or fixed rent contracts? 
We show below that when both contracts operate under liquidity constraint (i.e., when 
liquidity is below >R), the intersection of the two utility curves is also at K1, suggesting that 
an increase in available liquidity induces a shift from sharecropping to fixed rent as it does 
for risk neutral farmers.  When sharecroppers are not liquidity constrained, we show that 
the intersection of the two utility curves is to the right of K2, so it does take a higher 
increase in liquidity for risk averse tenants to switch from sharecropping to fixed rent.  
By definition of K1, expected profit at this intersection is the same under the two contracts: 8#\ = "%'\()* − > = 8#] = %']()* − > 
where subscripts S and F represent the sharecropping and the fixed-rent contracts, 
respectively. At that point both revenue and therefore variance of profit are equal:   Var(#\) = ./H"%'\()*L/ = Var(#]) = ./H%']()*L/ 
Hence V\ = V] . So while both utility curves UF1 and US are lower than the expected 
profit curves F1 and S, they intersect at the same value K1, as represented on Figure 1. 
When the intersection of expected profit curves occurs at K2, if tenants did not adjust their 
labor choices to accommodate risk, expected profits would remain equal: 8#\ = "%'\()* − ,'\ = 8#] = %']()* − > 
but since ,'\ < >, the variance would be higher under the fixed rent contract: Var(#\) = ./H"%'\()*L/ < Var(#]) = ./H%']()*L/. 
Hence V]  would be lower than V\ at K2, and the difference between the curves is an 
increasing function of W./.  The constrained fixed-rent tenant will not re-optimize since he 
is applying less labor than optimal, but sharecroppers will re-optimize their labor choice.  
This induces them to lower their labor and increase their utility. Overall, the utility of the 
fixed rent tenant is now lower than that of the sharecropper at K2, and hence the 
intersection occurs to the right of K2, as represented on Figure 1. The shift to the right is 
greater for higher W./.  Hence in this simple model, risk aversion R and risk exposure ./	affect farmers’ decision in similar ways.   
This schematic model suggests that an increase in available liquidity will induce some 
tenants to switch from a share contract to a fixed rent contract in contracting for a given 
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plot of land. This switch is expected to happen less in the context of high risk or with 
tenants that are more risk averse.   
Considering however the decisions made at the household level rather than at the plot 
level, increasing working capital can also be used to increase the cultivated land area. The 
predictions that can be taken to the data are that with greater access to credit, tenants will 
weakly increase the land area that they cultivate and the probability that it be under fixed 
rent contract.  Concretely we will test in section 6 the effects of access to credit on the 
number of plots and the area planted under both types of contracts, and the relative 
importance of the two.  We have no measure of individual risk aversion, but will explore 
heterogeneity by level of risk exposure. 
 
3. The Context: Farming and access to land in Bangladesh 
In Bangladesh, the agricultural sector accounts for about 18% of GDP (BBS 2013) and 
43% of the country’s employed population (BBS 2017). Cropping patterns are determined 
by the rainfall cycle. The monsoon season extends from mid-June to mid-October, with the 
rest of the year a continuous dry period where agriculture is practiced with irrigation 
(available on 60% of the cultivated area). Crops are grown over three seasons: the Aman 
season extends from July-August to November-December and mostly depends on 
monsoon rainfall; the Boro season extends from December-January to April-May and 
depends on tube-well irrigation; and the Aus season bridges the other two between March-
April and June-July, also depending on irrigation.5 Rice is by far the most important crop 
contributing 61% of total crop value (Ahmed 2004). Of the three seasons, Boro is the most 
important for rice, contributing 55% of annual output, while Aman contributes 38%, and 
Aus 7%.  
The land rental market is highly developed and increasingly important among rural farm 
households. Data from agricultural censuses show that the percentage of rural farm 
households that are pure tenants (i.e. that have no land of their own, but cultivate land 
rented from others) grew from 1.1% in 1996 to 3.1% in 2008 (BBS 1999; BBS 2010). 
Mixed-tenant households (i.e., that cultivate both owned and rented land) grew from 
37.5% to 39.8% over the same period. In terms of area, the share of land cultivated under 
tenancy arrangements also increased, with 24% of total cultivated land in 2008, against 
22% in 1996 (BBS 1999; BBS 2011).  Rental of land is more prevalent in the Boro than 
the Aman season, as cultivation under irrigation is more labor intensive, and hence 
landowners sublet more of their lands to tenants. 
                                               
5 https://www.pecad.fas.usda.gov/cropexplorer/pecad_stories.aspx?regionid=bg&ftype=prodbriefs. These 
three seasons are also called Kharif 2, Rabi, and Kharif 1, respectively. 
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Contract types have also evolved over time, with a decline of sharecropping arrangements 
in favor of diverse forms of fixed rent contracts.  Yet, in 2008, 43% of rented land was still 
under share tenancy, 17% in land mortgaging, and the remaining in different forms of 
seasonal fixed rent contracts (BBS 2011). Under sharecropping contracts, owners and 
tenants share output and some input costs. The dominant contract is a 50-50 share in crop 
output, with large variations in non-labor input cost sharing. Under the mortgaging system, 
the lender takes possession of the land as soon as the mortgage payment (serving as fixed 
rent) is made, and holds onto it until the debt is repaid; there is no interest paid on the loan 
as the lender is expected to earn income from using the land (Bode, Haq, and Dev 2013). 
Seasonal fixed rent contracts used to be mainly an agreement for the payment of a fixed 
amount of the produce after harvesting.  Yet over time, they have evolved to a system of a 
fixed amount of money rather than produce, and to a payment before tenants could 
cultivate rather than at harvest time (Raihan, Fatehin, and Haque 2009). We report below 
in section 5.3 on contracts for the population in our study, distinguishing between these 
different forms of fixed rent contracts.  
Share contracts and fixed rents contracts are typically for one season, although they are 
often renewed for the following season or for the same season the following year (Jansen 
1986, as cited by Reiersen 2004; Jabbar 1978). For land mortgaging contracts, the 
minimum length is typically two cropping seasons. National level data show that 49% of 
mortgage contracts are for one year, 24% for two years, and the rest for more than two 
years (BBS 1999).  
Evidence shows that smallholder farmers in Bangladesh have limited access to financial 
services. Hossain and Bayes (2009), for example, observe that only 1.5% of farmers 
owning less than 0.20 hectares of land had access to a formal loan in 2008 (and this was 
mostly from microfinance institutions) while the corresponding proportion for those 
owning more than two hectares of land was 20%.  
 
4. The credit program and research design 
In 2010, BRAC, a Bangladeshi NGO providing microfinance services and social programs 
to the poor, started a new credit program for landless workers (with some farming 
experience as tenants) and smallholder farmers known as the Borgachashi (Sharecropper) 
Unnoyon (Development) Program (BCUP). The program is operated in the traditional 
microfinance framework but provides unique advantages: a low interest rate (the effective 
interest rate is 20% compared to the traditional microfinance interest rate of about 25%), 
monthly repayments, and lower levels of installment for the first four months. To be 
eligible for the credit program, a household must meet the following six criteria: (i) have a 
national ID card; (ii) an age between 18 and 60 years; (iii) an education level not more than 
grade 10; (iv) permanent residence in the targeted area for at least three years; (iv) at least 
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three years of farming experience; (v) a total holding size including rented land if any 
between 33 and 200 decimals (a decimal is 1/100 of an acre); and (vi) not be a member of 
any NGO program. The targeting criterion related to landholding indicates that the 
program is intended to serve smallholder farmers including landless tenants, small owner 
farmers, and mixed tenants (who cultivate both own and rented land). Once a farmer has 
started with the program, access to BCUP loans continues even if his/her cultivating land 
increases beyond the 200 decimals threshold.6  Borrowers are required to save BDT 50 per 
month. Furthermore, 5% of the total amount is deducted as security savings at the time of 
loan disbursement.  
For the purpose of evaluation, BRAC’s introduction of the program in 2012 followed an 
experimental design over 40 branch offices (each covering a geographical area of about 5-
6 km radius from the BRAC local office) from 22 districts.7 BRAC’s Research and 
Evaluation Division (RED) randomly selected 20 branches for intervention with the 
remaining 20 branches serving as controls, both widely scattered across the country.8 
Starting in September 2012, BRAC offered credit to eligible households in the treatment 
branch offices. An eligible household can take credit for the following purposes: (i) general 
credit for working capital (amounting to BDT 5,000-30,000); (ii) credit to purchase 
machinery (BDT 30,000-120,000); and (iii) credit for land leasing/mortgaging (BDT 
30,000-60,000).9 In this paper, we estimate the effect on land contracts of all three types of 
credit as money is fungible.10  
 
5. Data, program take up, and descriptive statistics 
5.1 Data 
Each branch covers multiple villages (10 on average), and, while the program was 
introduced at the level of the branch, for the purpose of the analysis, RED randomly 
selected 6 villages in each branch. Prior to the start of the program, in April-May 2012, 
RED carried out a village census in these villages and identified eligible households. It 
turned out that there were no eligible households in three villages, so the sample consists in 
237 villages, 118 in treatment branches and 117 in control branches. The census identified 
                                               
6This credit program is operated through group formation, known as village organizations (VO). Members 
are grouped in teams of five members, and four to eight teams form a VO (Hossain et al. 2014). VOs serve as 
solidarity groups, but do not have joint liability. 
7During 2010-2012 (up to October) the program covered 646,000 households (Hossain et al. 2014). 
8 The evaluation design is also explained in Hossain et al. (2014) and Hossain et. al. (2018). The on line 
Figure A1 maps the location of the treatment and control sites. 
9In 2014, the exchange rate with the US$ was BDT 77.64. 
10 The program also offered extension services to participants, but only 7% of program participants in the 
sample received these services. The reason for the low take up of extension services was a supply side 
constraint. This proportion is however not different from the national average: 8% of farm households 
cultivating 0.05-0.49 acres received extension services in 2008 (BBS 2011). Because of this, throughout the 
paper, we use the term “effect of credit” in referring to the impact of the program.	
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7,563 eligible households. From the list of eligible households, 4,301 households were 
randomly selected for the analysis proportionately to the number of eligible households in 
each village (2,155 households from treatment areas and 2,146 from control areas). The 
baseline survey was carried out in July-August 2012. A follow-up survey was administered 
in July-August, 2014, successfully revisiting 4,141 households (2,072 households from 
treatment and 2,069 from control areas). The overall attrition rate was low (3.72%). 
Results of an OLS regression of attrition on the treatment indicator and the number of 
fixed rent and share contracts in the Boro season show that all estimated coefficients are 
small and statistically insignificant, indicating that there is no significant difference in 
attrition rates between treatment and control areas, and that baseline outcome variables are 
not correlated with attrition. 11 
The surveys collected information for the last three cropping seasons on the number of 
plots households cultivated and, for each plot, on whether owned or rented. For all plots 
reported as rented, information on the type of contract was recorded. For the largest plot 
from each sample household, information was also collected on costs and returns (physical 
amounts as well as market value of outputs), and rental rates in each season.  In the follow-
up survey, the landlord’s share of input costs was also collected.12 We will use this 
information to compare contract terms. 
 
5.2 Program take up 
Loan disbursement started in September 2012, when the Aman cropping season was 
already on. Twenty percent of eligible households successfully revisited from treatment 
areas participated in the credit program offered by BRAC.13  Forty nine percent of them 
took one loan from BRAC, 49.6% two loans, and the remaining 1.5% three loans. Of these 
participant households, 19% took their first loan in 2012, 70% in 2013, and 11% in 2014. 
Among those who took second and third loans, 76% did so in 2014. Information on the 
months in which loans were taken is not, however, available. Figure 2 graphs the 
distribution of BCUP loans, showing significant variation. Most loans are between BDT 
                                               
11 Timeline of data collection and OLS regression of attrition are reported in the online Supplemental 
Material. 
12 The reason for collecting information for the largest plot was pragmatic: cheaper than asking for all the 
plots, and easier than having to proceed to the selection of a random plot. In addition, we thought that the 
tenant may pay more attention and recall better the information on the largest plot.   
13 This number seems low compared to the 45% uptake reported in Karlan, Morduch, and Mullainathan 
(2010), based on a 1991/92 survey done in 87 villages that were served by three microfinance institutions. A 
different study using population based data shows that about three-quarters of households are eligible for 
microcredit in Bangladesh, but less than a quarter participate in a program (Evans, 1999).  Similar evidence 
of low uptake is found in other contexts. For example, the uptake rate of microcredit is 13% Morocco 
(Crépon et al. 2015), 17% in India (Banerjee et al. 2015), and 31% in Ethiopia (Tarozzi, Desai, and Johnson 
2015). Recent branch level information for the 20 treated branches shows a sharp increase in uptake from 
1,496 borrowers in 2012, to 14,066 in 2014, and 20,423 in 2017, suggesting that it takes some years for a 
new program to fully develop.  
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10,000 and 30,000. Average and median loan amounts are BDT 20,327 and 20,000, 
respectively. At the household level, over the two years, the average loan amount among 
households that took any loan is BDT 31,000. When asked for the purpose of their BCUP 
loans, 46% of respondents say it was for crop cultivation, 12% for livestock, poultry, and 
fishing, 12% for their business, and 30% for other purposes (which include house repairs, 
land mortgage, consumption, etc.).  To get a sense of the size of these loans, a loan of BDT 
15,000 could typically cover the non-labor production costs and rental for 0.17 ha, which is 
a bit more than the average plot size of 0.12 ha in the baseline.14 Treatment and control 
households also took loans from other sources; we discuss this in Section 5.3.   
The timing of the follow-up survey (in July-August 2014) is such that Aman season data 
refer to 2013, the first year of the program, while Boro season data are for 2014. We 
therefore focus the analysis on the Boro season, when the program had more time to have 
impacts, although we will provide some results for the Aman season as a robustness check 
on our results for the Boro season.  
 
5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
We report in Table 1 baseline characteristics for the surveyed households. Asset 
endowments are very low, with average 3.1 years of education for the household head and 
amount of land owned equal to 0.25 ha (of which 0.18 ha are cultivated, with the rest being 
for homestead, garden, fallows, etc.).15 The median household in our sample owned 0.16 
hectares of land at baseline, indicating that more than half the sample households are 
considered functionally landless. 16 Land rental contracts are quite frequent, with 56% of all 
households engaged in contracting during the Boro season (and 35% during the Aman 
season). Sharecropping is the most prevalent, accounting for 60% of all contracts in the 
Boro season (and 66% in the Aman season). Similarly, 60% of tenanted lands were under 
share contract for baseline Boro season (not reported in the table). The prevalence of share 
contracts among this near landless population is higher than the 43% reported at the 
national level by BBS (2011). In the Boro season, 32% of households have only share 
contracts, 19% only fixed rent, and 5% are engaged in both types of contracts. Around 
14% of surveyed households had outstanding loans from formal sources (5.9% from a 
formal bank and 8.1% from an MFI) at baseline. Additionally, 9% of households reported 
having outstanding loans from informal sources.  
Online Appendix Table A2 presents the differences in baseline means for key observable 
characteristics of the survey households between treatment and control groups. Standard 
                                               
14 Based on information collected for the largest plot of tenants in the Boro 2014 season. 
15 Land owned reported in Hossain et al. (2018) only accounts for owner-operated land and is therefore 
slightly smaller at 0.154 ha (38.11 decimals). 
16In Bangladesh, households owning less than 50 decimals of lands (0.2 ha) are considered to be functionally 
landless (Scott and Islam 2008). 
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errors of the differences are clustered at the BRAC branch office level (the unit of 
randomization). None of the differences in baseline means of the outcome variables are 
statistically significant, and most are small, suggesting that randomization is balanced 
across observables. One exception, however, is the relatively large difference in the 
number of fixed rent contracts: 0.50 and 0.59 for the treatment and control groups, 
respectively (with p-value of 0.52). Because this is one of the main outcome variables, we 
propose in section 6 to use a difference-in-differences method to control for that 
imbalance. 
Contract terms for sharecropping follow the national trends described above.  Landlord’s 
output share is most often 50% (for 62% of the Boro and 85% of the Aman contracts), and 
otherwise 33%.  There is some sharing of input costs. 17   Landlords participate to input 
costs in 36% of the Boro and 18% of the Aman share-contracts.  Irrigation costs are 
important in the Boro season, amounting on average to 30% of all costs and 38% among 
tenants whose landlord share some costs.  Landlords that participate in cost-sharing in the 
Boro season on average contribute to 28% of all costs (48% of irrigation costs, 22% of 
fertilizer costs, and 13% of other costs).  In the Aman season, there is very little irrigation 
and even fertilizer costs are lower, so that labor costs dominate, amounting to 40% of input 
costs.  Landlords that participate in costs contribute on average 22% of all costs (58.9% of 
fertilizer costs and 9.5% of other costs).  
Analyzing the data on costs and returns collected for the largest plot shows that gross 
output is on average larger on plots under fixed-rent than under sharecropping in both 
years of observation, by 8 to 15% when comparing medians and 3 to 8% when comparing 
means.  Cash costs are also a bit higher, but net revenue remains higher on plots in fixed-
rent contract.  While these suggest a higher efficiency in fixed rent contracts, as expected 
from theory, note that these correlations are not causal as the choice of contract is 
endogenous to the tenant and to the plot.   
Our data also show that tenant farmers do switch between share and fixed rent contracts. In 
the control branch offices, 15% of tenants that had only share contract(s) at baseline had 
only fixed rent contract(s) at the time of the follow-up survey. Another 46% reported to 
continue with share contracts only. And the remaining 39% had no land contract at follow-
up time. On the other hand, 13% of tenants that had only fixed rent contract(s) at baseline 
had only share contract(s) at follow-up time. On a season-to-season basis, 19% of 
sharecropping contracts in the Aman season of the baseline were discontinued and 5% 
switched to fixed rent contract in the following Boro season. Among contracts that were 
under fixed rent (cash), 64.9% continued with the same type of contract, 33.9% were 
discontinued, and the remaining 1.2% switched to other types of contracts. Of the fixed 
rent contracts under mortgage in the Aman season, 92% continued in the next season.   
                                               
17 Landlord’s participation in these costs was only collected in the follow-up survey.  
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In on line Appendix Table A3, we provide information on credit market participation of 
the surveyed households during the two years prior to the follow-up survey. Information 
indicates that access to BRAC’s BCUP loans by participant households did not replace 
loans from other sources. Specifically, 19% of treatment households took loans from a 
formal institution other than BRAC’s BCUP against 22% in the control group, and the 
difference is not statistically significant and equal to what was observed at baseline. 
Similarly, for the loan amounts from these sources, we do not observe a significant 
difference between the two groups. Access to loans from informal sources was also similar 
across treatment and control groups. Overall, we do see that the program induces a large 
increase in access to credit, with 40% of treatment households taking loans from any 
sources against 27% in the control group. 
 
6. Results and discussion 
6.1. Impact of access to credit on contract choice in the Boro season 
Descriptive statistics showed that differences in baseline means of the outcome variables 
between treatment and control groups are all statistically insignificant, but the magnitude 
of the difference is relatively large for fixed rent contracts. For this reason, we use a 
difference-in-differences specification controlling for household fixed effects to estimate 
the causal effect of the intervention: 
_^`a = "_ + ba + cdeffghijk` ∗ mnfoa + p_`a      (3) 
where _^`a  is the outcome variable of interest for household i in branch office j and time 
period t. Time periods refer to 2012 (for baseline) and 2014 (for follow-up). deffghijk` 
takes the value of 1 if branch office j is assigned to treatment and zero to control. mnfoa is 
an indicator variable taking the value of 0 if t = 2012 and 1 if t = 2014. "_ are household 
fixed effects and ba time fixed effects. p_`a  is an error term clustered at the BRAC branch 
office level, the unit of randomization. The parameter c identifies the causal intention-to-
treat (ITT) effect of the intervention.  
We also estimate treatment-on-the-treated (ToT) effects using an instrumental variable 
(IV) approach. The estimating equation is: _^`a = "_ + ba + qd-jeojk_` ∗ mnfoa + p_`a      (4) 
where d-jeojk_` takes the value of 1 if household i has participated in the program. The 
parameter q identifies the causal ToT effect of the intervention. Since not all eligible 
households from treated areas participated in the program, d-jeojk_`  (and hence, d-jeojk_` ∗ mnfoa) is endogenous. d-jeojk_` ∗ mnfoa  is instrumented on deffghijk` ∗mnfoa. We estimate the following equation for the first stage: d-jeojk_` ∗ mnfoa = "_ + ba + rdeffghijk` ∗ mnfoa + p_`a   (5) 
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Table 2 reports estimated effects of the intervention on the number of share and fixed rent 
contracts and on the total number of contracts. Panel A presents the results of estimating 
equation (3) and panel B equation (4). The coefficients on the Post variable show that over 
these two years there has been a large decline in the number of sharecropping contracts (by 
0.157 plot, or 19% of the baseline value of 0.809 in the control group), with no 
compensating increase in fixed rent contracts.  Against this backdrop, the impact of the 
program has been no differential decline in sharecropping contracts (Panel A, col. 1), but a 
large increase in fixed rent contracts by 0.190 plots, or 33.8% of the value in the control 
group at follow up (Panel A, col. 2).  These two changes compensate each other for the 
treated group (Panel A, col. 3), suggesting an overall shift from share-contracts to fixed 
rent contracts in this group. 18 This aggregate result on land rental is consistent with the 
results in Hossain et al. (2018).19 
Focusing on the beneficiary households that took on the credit program (the ToT effect 
reported in Panel B), we estimate that they have nearly one additional plot (0.947) in fixed 
rent in response to their access to credit, a very large increase of 168% over the mean value 
of 0.562 for the control group at follow up. These findings are in line with our testable 
hypothesis, and are consistent with the results from existing studies on the relationship 
between credit and contracting (Laffont and Matoussi 1995; Chaudhuri and Maitra 1997). 
Regression results presented in column 3 of Table 2 show that effect of the intervention on 
the total number of contracts is positive and large, although not statistically significant. 
These IV results measure a local average treatment effect, meaning that they apply to the 
selected 20% of the eligible population that did apply in this case or would have applied in 
the control group, had they been offered the credit.  There is a strong first-stage, with the 
estimated coefficient on the interaction term highly significant (at the 1% level). Point 
estimate of this coefficient is consistent with the fact that about 20% of those that are 
assigned to treatment participated in the credit program (Panel C).  
Table 3 reports change in total land area under share and fixed rent contracts due to access 
to credit, using the same specifications (3) to (5). Results in column 2 indicate that the 
program increases the land area under fixed rent contracts by 29.5% (ITT effect). For the 
land area under share contracts, the effect of credit is very small and statistically 
insignificant (column 1). For those that did take the offer (Panel B results), the program 
induced an increase in land area by 0.20 ha 	in total or 0.27 in fixed-rent, 20 which is 
                                               
18 We report in on line Appendix Table A4 the results of a simple cross-sectional difference estimation, 
controlling for baseline outcome.  Results are similar to the diff-in-diffs specification, but less precise.  19	The two analyses however differ on three aspects. Hossain et al. (2018) (i) use an annual aggregate 
measure of land rented in, while we construct the rental by aggregating plot-by-plot seasonal information; (ii) 
use a linear specification with district fixed effects and baseline covariates, while we use a log specification 
for the dependent variable and individual fixed effects; (iii) consider only the aggregate rental, while we 
focus on the contrast between contract types. We describe in the Supplemental on-line Appendix the 
construction of the land rental variable. 
20 Using the ToT results in panel B:  (js.tsu − 1) ∗ .161 = 0.20	and (jQ.xyQ − 1) ∗ .08 = 0.27. 
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reassuringly in line with the 0.17 ha we had computed in Section 5.3 as what the average 
loan taken by households could cover if it were used for all non-labor costs and rent.** 
We analyze in Table 4 whether relaxation of the liquidity constraint affects differentially 
the intensive and extensive margins in contracting. The intensive margin is characterized 
by individuals with baseline contract experience (56% of the sample). These individuals 
had the interest and ability to contract without the credit provided by the program. The 
extensive margin, by contrast, is characterized by the 44% individuals with no baseline 
contract experience. We find that both margins display a positive increase in fixed rent 
contracting. The effect for individuals with contracting experience at baseline is equal to 
0.221 additional plots, larger although not significantly so, than the 0.134 plots for the 
extensive margin.  
We decompose in on line Appendix Table A5 the effect of loan access on the three 
different types of fixed rent contracts, cash rent (paid in advance), rent in kind (paid at 
harvest), and mortgage, described above.  Results show that the increase in fixed rent 
contract is mostly for in-kind contracts, and to a lesser extent for cash contracts. This 
suggests that at least over these first two years of the program, tenants were using the loan 
for input costs rather than land rents.  
Note that these results have to be interpreted as the effects of having had access to credit 
for the population of eligibles (for the ITT) or having taken a credit for the selected group 
that did choose to take the credit (for the ToT) over the past two years.  When to take a 
credit and the amount taken are indeed endogenous.   
 
6.2. Heterogeneity of effects with respect to risk exposure 
Throughout the year in Bangladesh the main sources of risk for rice cultivation are 
drought, flood, extreme temperatures, and pests (Shelley et al. 2016). During the dry Boro 
season on which we focus, all rice cultivation is under irrigation, and extreme temperatures 
are the main risk. Rice grows normally within the temperature range of 20°C to 35°C, and 
is particularly sensitive to low temperature in its initial stage (March) and high temperature 
in its final stage (April). To characterize weather at the branch level, we matched each of 
the 40 branches in the experiment with the closest of 16 weather stations.21 We verify in 
Table A6 that, in our 2012-2014 panel data for the control villages, yield is indeed 
negatively affected by temperature dropping below 20°C in March and by temperature 
exceeding 35°C in April (although when jointly estimated, the high temperature in April 
dominates). These events are cross-sectionally important. In 2012, 47.6% of the 
observations had March temperatures below 20°C and 14.2% April temperatures above 
35°C. The corresponding figures for 2014 are 77.2% and 79.6%, respectively, a year with 
                                               
21 Temperature data were collected from the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (various issues of the Statistical 
Pocketbook and Monthly Statistical Bulletin). 
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exceptionally high temperatures. The low temperature event reduces yield by 0.57 
kg/decimal (23 kg/ha) and the high temperature event by 1.8 kg/decimal (73 kg/ha), which 
correspond to 2.8 and 8.8% of the mean yield, respectively. We therefore characterize the 
risk associated with low and high temperatures by the probability of facing a temperature 
below 20°C in March and above 35°C in April, respectively, measured by the proportion 
of years that experienced this temperature in the 10-year period 2003-2012. We should 
note that while temperatures are the main weather risk for this season, farmers face other 
idiosyncratic risks such as pests.   
We extend equation (3) to estimate heterogeneity of effects with respect to risk: 
_^`a = "_ + ba + &Qdeffghijk` ∗ mnfoa +	&/deffghijk` ∗ mnfoa ∗ -gf|` 																													+&}mnfoa ∗ -gf|` + p_`a  (6) 
where -gf|` is a measure of baseline exposure to risk for branch office j (corresponding to 
the term σ/  in the model). The parameters of interest are &Q  and &/ . This equation 
estimates the ITT effect of the intervention. We expect &/ to be negative for fixed rent 
contracts and positive for share contracts.  
Table 5 shows how exposure to low and high temperature risk affects the impact of access 
to credit on land contract during the Boro season. We find that risk associated with 
exposure to low temperature has a large negative effect on the impact of credit on fixed 
rent contracting. Risk associated with high temperature does not have a significant effect 
on the role of credit on contracting. When considered together, the low temperature risk is 
the one that dominates on the role of credit in contacting, with a large and highly 
significant coefficient.  A potential reason for this asymmetric result is that in our data, 
there is little variation in high-temperature risk: 38% of the observations have a 0 high 
temperature risk, and 78% have a risk less or equal to 20%.  In contrast, the distribution of 
risk of cold temperature is almost bimodal with probabilities of either 0.2-0.3 or 0.6-0.7, 
and mean value 0.424. This makes it easier to identify its effect.  To see the order of 
magnitude of this effect, consider the two modal values of 30% and 70% probability of a 
cold spell.  The regression results suggest that in an area with a 30% probability of low 
temperature (low risk) the credit program induces an increase of fixed rent rental by 
(0.495-0.3*0.696) = 0.286 plots, significant at 1%, while there is no effect at all in a high-
risk area with a 70% chance of cold weather. The result thus confirms the model prediction 
that access to liquidity has a greater effect on increasing fixed rent contracts when there is 
less need for sharecropping as a risk-reducing instrument.22   
                                               
22 We also verified that contract choice responds to temperature shocks in a panel regression among control 
households. Experience of a high temperature event in April of the previous year induces an increase in 
sharecropping contracts and a (non-significant) decrease in fixed rent contracts, and a low temperature event 
in March of the previous year a significant decrease in fixed-rent contracts and a non-significant decrease in 
sharecropping contracts. These responses to shocks are consistent with a simple liquidity effect, but also 
subject to other possible confounding channels of influence from temperature shocks to contract choice. On 
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Like with any cross-sectional variation, it remains possible that there are some 
confounding factors that we cannot completely eliminate. Those would be factors 
correlated with temperature risk at the station level that would also induce a differential 
response in contracts to the availability of credit. Because we do not have any reliable 
measure of risk aversion at the individual level, this parameter measures the impact of 
temperature risk at the average level of risk aversion in the population, implicitly assuming 
that the distribution of risk aversion is not correlated with temperature risk. We should thus 
consider these results as suggestive rather than a definite test.  
 
6.3 Results for the 2013 Aman season 
The main focus of this paper has been on the 2014 Boro season, which took place two 
years after the onset of the program. Because of the timing of the endline survey, the Aman 
season is that of 2013, just one year into the program, and hence with a lower uptake than 
in the next Boro season. On the other hand, Aman crops cultivated mostly under rainfed 
conditions have much lower production costs, meaning they can be undertaken with less 
credit. Estimation of the ITT effects of having had access to credit for one year on the 
number of land contracts in the Aman season show that the program increases the number 
of fixed rent contracts by 0.182, a result that is significant at the 10% level (on line 
Appendix Table A7). This result is less precisely estimated but similar to the effect 
measured for the Boro season reported in Table 2.  Relative to the control group mean, 
however, this effect is twice as large as the effect for the Boro season.  
 
7. Conclusion 
A voluminous literature provides theoretical explanations on the Marshallian puzzle of 
sharecropping (Hayami and Otsuka 1993). Because a share contract is inferior to a fixed 
rent contract in eliciting effort under first-best conditions, sharecropping should not prevail 
under those conditions, posing the puzzle of its widespread existence. The literature has 
consequently explored conditions of market failure under which a share contract may be 
preferred to a fixed rent contract. In addition to risk with insurance market failure (Stiglitz 
1974), the role of a financial constraint was proposed by Laffont and Matoussi (1995). 
Liquidity constrained tenants need contract land as sharecroppers until the liquidity 
constraint no longer binds at which time they can switch to fixed rent. Rigorous empirical 
evidence on the importance of liquidity on the choice of contract was however still 
missing. This paper advances our quantitative knowledge on the puzzle of sharecropping 
                                                                                                                                              
the other hand, we are unable to find a cross-sectional relationship between contract structure and 
temperature risk in the baseline data.  This is likely due to the small number of weather stations and the 
impossibility of controlling for the many factors that determine contract choice in this cross-sectional 
regression. 
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by using a randomized experiment of the effect of access to credit on the choice of land 
contract in the context of Bangladesh where almost half of land tenure arrangements are 
share contracts. The testable hypothesis is derived from a model of contract choice for a 
given land plot under credit constraint, and on how this relation is modified by exposure to 
uninsured risk. 
The program we analyze focuses on landless and near landless households with farming 
experience, and the impact is measured two years after the onset of the program, when 
approximately 20% of eligible households had taken at least one credit. As predicted by 
theory, we find evidence that the effect of access to credit for potential tenants on the 
number of, and area under, fixed rent relative to share contracts is positive, significant, and 
large in magnitude, a result consistent with the evidence provided by Laffont and Matoussi 
(1995). The effect is found to be heterogeneous, being larger for farmers who are less 
exposed to production risk as measured by the incidence of extreme temperatures, a result 
consistent with Stiglitz’s (1974) theoretical prediction.  
A large empirical literature documents the inefficiency of sharecropping relative to fixed 
rent contracts in terms of input use (Shaban 1987; Bell 1977). The findings of our study 
suggest that improved access to credit for landless tenants and smallholder farmers can 
raise the efficiency of land contracting by increasing fixed rent relative to share rent 
contracts. Microfinance programs that help relax liquidity constraints on land rental for 
potential tenants can thus be sources of efficiency gains for the rural poor through the 
choice of better contracts. 
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Table 1. Baseline characteristics of households and contracts 
 
 
 	  
Mean%value
Standard%
deviation
Household%head%is%male* 0.933 (0.251)
Age%of%household%head%(years) 44.8 (11.7)
Years%of%household%head%education 3.1 (3.4)
Primary%occupation%of%household%head%is%agriculture* 0.654 (0.475)
Household%is%food%secure* 0.791 (0.406)
House%has%electricity%connection* 0.594 (0.491)
Area%of%land%owned%(ha) 0.25 (0.28)
%%of%which%cultivated%land%(ha) 0.18 (0.24)
Household%has%outstanding%loan%from%banks* 0.059 (0.24)
Amount%of%outstanding%loans%from%banks%(conditional,%BDT) 27029 (42292)
Household%has%outstanding%loan%from%MFIs* 0.081 (0.27)
Amount%of%outstanding%loans%from%MFIs%(conditional,%BDT) 15709 (32117)
Household%has%outstanding%loan%from%informal%sources* 0.089 (0.28)
Amount%of%outstanding%loans%from%informal%sources%(conditional,%BDT) 61502 (98485)
Land%contracts%in%the%Boro%season
Household%has%land%contract* 0.56 (0.50)
Household%has%only%sharecropping%contracts* 0.32 (0.47)
Household%has%only%fixed%rent%contracts* 0.19 (0.40)
Household%has%both%contracts* 0.05 (0.22)
Total%number%of%land%contracts 1.35 (1.73)
Number%of%share%contracts 0.81 (1.42)
Number%of%fixed%rent%contracts 0.54 (1.20)
Land%contracts%in%the%Aman%season
Total%number%of%land%contracts 0.85 (1.52)
Number%of%share%contracts 0.56 (1.26)
Number%of%fixed%rent%contracts 0.29 (0.90)
N 4141
%*%indicates%binary%variable%%(Yes=1,%No=0)
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Table 2. Effects of access to credit on the number of share and fixed rent contracts 
 
 	  
Number	of	share	
contracts
Number	of	fixed	
rent	contracts
Total	number	of	
contracts
Panel	A:	ITT
Assigned*Post 0.004 0.190** 0.194
(0.075) (0.090) (0.125)
Post -0.157*** -0.0251 -0.182**
(0.057) (0.041) (0.069)
Individual	fixed	effects Yes Yes Yes
R-sq 0.011 0.008 0.005
Panel	B:	TOT	(IV	regression)
Treated*Post	(instrumented) 0.0204 0.947* 0.968
(0.366) (0.501) (0.665)
Post -0.157*** -0.0251 -0.182***
(0.056) (0.041) (0.068)
First	stage:	Treated*Post
Assigned*Post 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Individual	fixed	effects Yes Yes Yes
N 8282 8282 8282
Mean	outcome	in	control	group	at	follow	up 0.662 0.562 1.223
Standard	errors	in	parentheses,	clustered	at	the	branch	office	level
*	p<0.10,		**	p<0.05,		***	p<0.01
	 23	
Table 3. Effects of credit on the land area under share and fixed rent contracts 
 
 
 
 	  
Log	of	land	area	
under	share	
contracts
Log	of	land	area	
under	fixed	rent	
contracts
Log	of	total	land	
area	under	all	
contracts
Panel	A:	ITT
Assigned*Post -0.0236 0.295** 0.162
(0.097) (0.121) (0.137)
Post -0.230*** 0.0382 -0.188***
(0.064) (0.057) (0.054)
Individual	fixed	effects Yes Yes Yes
R-sq 0.014 0.015 0.004
Panel	B:	TOT	(IV	regression)
Treated*Post	(instrumented) -0.118 1.471** 0.806
(0.482) (0.685) (0.694)
Post -0.230*** 0.0382 -0.188***
(0.063) (0.056) (0.053)
Individual	fixed	effects Yes Yes Yes
N 8282 8282 8282
Mean	area	in	control	at	follow	up	(ha) 0.081 0.080 0.161
Because	some	observations	have	0	land	area,	we	added	1	decimal	(0.0040	ha)	to	each	observation
Standard	errors	in	parentheses,	clustered	at	the	branch	office	level
*	p<0.10,		**	p<0.05,		***	p<0.01
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Table 4. Effects of credit on the number of land contracts: Extensive and intensive 
margins 
 
 
 	  
Number	of	share	
contracts
Number	of	fixed	
rent	contracts
Total	number	of	
contracts
Assigned*Post 0.0155 0.221* 0.237
(0.131) (0.123) (0.171)
Aassigned*Post*No	baseline	contract -0.0568 -0.0869 -0.144
(0.145) (0.122) (0.168)
Post -0.490*** -0.202*** -0.692***
(0.0952) (0.0664) (0.0953)
Post*No	baseline	contract 0.781*** 0.415*** 1.196***
(0.111) (0.0751) (0.0996)
Individual	fixed	effects Yes Yes Yes
N 8282 8282 8282
R-sq 0.074 0.028 0.108
Assgn*Post+Assgn*Post*No	baseline	contract -0.041 0.134* 0.093
(0.0501) (0.069) (0.080)
Standard	errors	in	parentheses,	clustered	at	the	branch	office	level
*	p<0.10,		**	p<0.05,		***	p<0.01
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Table 5. Effects of credit on the number of land contracts: Heterogeneity by temperature risk exposure 
 
 
 
 
Low	temperature	risk Low/High	temperature	risk
Number	of	contracts: Share Fixed Total	 Share Fixed Total	 Share Fixed Total	
Assigned*Post 0.0441 0.495*** 0.539*** 0.0714 0.162 0.234 -0.00147 0.550*** 0.549**
(0.130) (0.150) (0.184) (0.0886) (0.108) (0.161) (0.130) (0.159) (0.223)
Assigned*Post*Low	temp.	risk -0.0951 -0.696** -0.791* 0.178 -0.811*** -0.633
(0.274) (0.306) (0.412) (0.265) (0.283) (0.422)
Assigned*Post*High	temp.	risk -0.0184 0.139 0.120 -0.00468 -0.183 -0.188
(0.264) (0.317) (0.468) (0.283) (0.305) (0.527)
Individual	fixed	effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8282 8282 8282 8282 8282 8282 8282 8282 8282
R-sq 0.011 0.014 0.009 0.015 0.008 0.008 0.015 0.015 0.011
Standard	errors	in	parentheses,	clustered	at	the	branch	office	level;	*	p<0.10,		**	p<0.05,		***	p<0.01
Variables	Post,	Post*Low	temp.	risk,	and	Post*High	temp.	risk	included.
Low	temperature	risk	is	the	proportion	of	years	in	2003-2012	in	which	the	lowest	temperature	in	March	was	below	20	degree	Celsius.		High	
temperature	risk	is	the	proportion	of	years	in	which	the	highest	temperature	in	April	was	above	35	degree	Celsius.
High	temperature	risk
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Figure 1.  Expected profit and utility under sharecropping and fixed rent contracts 
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Figure 2. Distribution of BCUP loans taken by program participants 
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